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Abstract  
This paper examines the relationship between the level of public infrastructure and the level 
of productivity using panel data for the Spanish provinces over the period 1984-2004, a 
period which is particularly relevant due to the substantial changes occurring in the Spanish 
economy at that time. The underlying model used for the data analysis is based on the wage 
equation, which is one of a handful of simultaneous equations which when satisfied 
correspond to the short-run equilibrium of New Economic Geography theory. This is 
estimated using a spatial panel model with fixed time and province effects, so that 
unmodelled space and time constant sources of heterogeneity are eliminated. The model 
assumes that productivity depends on the level of educational attainment and the public 
capital stock endowment of each province. The results show that although changes in 
productivity are positively associated with changes in public investment within the same 
province, there is a negative relationship between productivity changes and changes in public 
investment in other regions. 
 
JEL Classifications: H54, R11, R15, C21 
Keywords: spatial economics, public infrastructure, productivity, panel data, economic 
geography 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The World Bank (1994) has referred to public capital as the one of the “wheels of 
economic growth”. This claim appears to be one that could be the basis for much 
empirical research, for it is evident that nowadays the role of public investment is very 
much in the spotlight as a possible way out of the current global economic downturn. 
Indeed, there has been considerable debate and several empirical studies to date about the 
potential impact of public capital on private sector economic performance. Since the 
beginning of the current economic crisis in August, 2007, many renowned institutions 
and economists have suggested the need for an expansive fiscal policy to alleviate the 
worldwide economic recession. At a time when falling demand is causing many private-
sector employers to invoke cutbacks, public investments which directly create jobs can 
generate demand and possibly help to break the downward economic spiral.  
 
Public investment is widely used to promote the development of poorer regions. This 
is especially true since the 1970s, when other alternative mechanisms were found to be of 
limited effect and costly from a budgetary and efficiency perspective. It is particularly 
significant in the euro area now that monetary policy is the responsibility of the European 
Central Bank.  
 
There are several channels through which public investment affects regional per 
capita income. It has a direct effect due to the multiplier process that the impact of 
demand might have in the economy, mainly during slumps, and an indirect effect 
attracting private investment to the area. Public investment can also have longer-lasting 
effect on a region’s economic development by inducing structural changes. It is therefore 
one of the main instruments in regional policy designed to reduce regional disequilibria. 
Macroeconomists typically emphasize three “conventional” channels through which 
public infrastructure may affect growth. Public investment has a direct productivity effect 
on private production inputs and a complementarity effect on private investment. Public 
capital in infrastructure may raise the marginal productivity of all factor inputs (capital 
and labour), thereby lowering marginal production costs and increasing the level of 
private production. In turn, this scale effect on output may lead, through the standard 
accelerator effect, to higher private investment, thereby raising production capacity over 
time and making the growth effect more persistent. In the short term, however, public 
investment could cause a crowding out effect on private spending through the financial 
system. An increase in the stock of public capital in infrastructure may have an adverse 
effect on activity, to the extent that it displaces (or crowds out) private investment. This 
short-run effect may develop into an adverse growth effect if the drop in private capital 
formation persists over time. As Agénor and Moreno Dodson (2006) maintain, crowding-
out effects may take various forms. For instance, if the public sector finances the 
expansion of public capital through an increase in distortionary taxes, the fall in the 
expected net rate of return on private capital may lower the propensity to invest. A 
similar, and possibly more detrimental, effect on private capital formation may occur if 
the increase in public infrastructure outlays is paid for by borrowing on domestic 
financial markets, as a result of either higher domestic interest rates (in countries where 
market forces are relatively free to operate) or a greater incidence of credit rationing in 
the private sector. Moreover, if investment-induced expansion in public borrowing raises 
concerns about the sustainability of public debt over time and strengthens expectations of 
a future increase in inflation or explicit taxation, the risk premium embedded in interest 
rates may increase. By raising the cost of borrowing and negatively affecting expected 
after-tax rates of return on private capital, an increase in the perceived risk of default on 
government debt may have a compounding effect on private capital accumulation. In 
particular, private investors may revise their investment plans downwards because of 
anticipated hikes in tax rates to cover the increase in public investment. If so, despite the 
direct and complementarities effects mentioned above, the net effect of an increase in 
public infrastructure may well be to hamper, rather than foster, economic growth. The 
importance of each effect might depend on the initial stock of the economy, the diversity 
of productive structures and the degree of maturity of infrastructure systems.  
 
 
The literature on the effects of public infrastructure is inconclusive, although there is 
a general consensus on the need for a certain level of public infrastructural provision; the 
results obtained differ substantially once this level is achieved. Studies are divided on 
both the magnitude and direction of the net effect of infrastructure on economic growth. 
The first author to detect a positive relationship between public infrastructure and 
productivity was Ratner (1983) though it was Aschauer (1989) who established that a 
decline in public investment was the main cause of the productivity slowdown in the 
United States in 1970s and 1980s. More recent studies have partially discredited the 
results obtained in early research. Many researchers agree that the apparently positive 
impact of public capital stock might be due to inadequate model specifications which 
cause spurious relations or fail to appropriately control for region or country 
heterogeneity. Empirical papers with a regional dimension showed a smaller impact of 
public investment on productivity, which it is argued might be a consequence of the 
existence of spatial spillover effects. 
 
Most empirical analyses use neoclassical production functions to quantify the public 
infrastructure effect on economic activity. Using this approach, some papers established a 
positive effect, including Munell (1990, 1993), Ford and Poret (1991), Bajo-Rubio and 
Sosvilla-Rivero (1993), Otto and Voss (1994), Mas et al. (1996) and Cantos et al. (2005). 
Others established a negative effect, such as McMillin and Smyth (1994), Otto and Voss 
(1996) and Voss (2002) and others find no significant effect of public investment on 
economic activity; this is true of Tatom (1991), Batina (1999), Holz and Eakin (1992), 
Evans and Karras (1994), Baltagi and Pinnoi (1995), García-Mila and McGuire (1992) 
and Gómez-Antonio and Fingleton (2008), among others.  
 
Many researchers had for a long time insisted that increasing returns were  essential 
for a proper understanding of spatial disparities in economic development, but this was 
given new impetus by the development of a formal theoretical framework, based on a  
monopolistic competition market structure model (Dixit and Stiglitz, 1977). The typical 
model proposes an ‘industry’ sector in which firms have fixed costs and hence internal 
increasing returns, leading to increasing returns at the aggregate level. This development 
of increasing returns based on micro-economic foundations, by proponents of New 
Economic geography and related models in urban economics, led to the integration of 
increasing returns models within mainstream economics. By incorporating imperfect 
competition, increasing returns and externalities in the form of market interdependence, 
there is an added realism in these models, without compromising rigour and the logic of a 
closed general equilibrium approach. Empirical research within New Economic 
Geography (NEG) did not really take off until very recently. A few papers use urban 
economics as a theoretical basis for analysing the relationship between public investment 
and economic growth, like Martin and Rogers (1995) and Martin (1999) but, to our 
knowledge, no study has empirically quantified this relationship using NEG theory.  
 
The wage equation is one of the most successful equations deriving from New 
Economic Geography. This equation formally links nominal wage levels to market 
potential, which is a long-established concept that goes right back to the work of Harris 
(1954) and is at the core of NEG theory. The key element is that firms have different 
levels of market potential according to their level of access to their own and 
neighbourhood markets, with access depending on trade costs, the size of the markets, 
and the competition, with good market access associated with higher wage levels. In this 
paper we will control for a variety of determinants of wage levels other than the 
pecuniary externalities of the basic model as set out by Fujita, Krugman and 
Venables(1999), including public capital stock.  
 
The main aim of this paper is to test Aschauer’s hypothesis and quantify the 
impact of public capital stock on productivity, something which, as far as we know, has 
not been attempted in the context of NEG theory. The Spanish economy provides an 
interesting case study as it has undergone a sustained period of growth in the last 40 
years, together with a large increase in public investment figures. The period analysed in 
this paper is 1984-2004, which is particularly relevant due to substantial changes in the 
Spanish economy during this time. At the beginning of the period, the level of 
government capital endowment and economic activity in the Spanish regions were far 
below those of other European economies. Since Spain joined the European Union, 
however, there has been a very intensive period of capital investment by the Spanish 
government with no perceptible slowing of investment due to economic cycles.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of productivity and public capital stock 1986-2001 
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Source: Authors’ calculations utilising data from FUNCAS and IVIE. 
 
This paper departs from the previous literature because we use a different theoretical 
approach, departing from the neoclassical production function. Our empirical model has 
as its basis the theoretical arguments of New Economic Geography. Our model 
specification allows us to estimates the effects of spillovers operating across geographical 
space. Most of the literature on public capital has focused on whether or not public 
infrastructure has positive productivity effects, but relatively little attention has been paid 
to the fact that the presence of public capital may shift economic activities from one 
location to another. The issue of possible spillovers from public capital has received little 
consideration. 
 
The results show that changes in provincial productivity are positively associated 
with changes in public investment within the same province but negatively associated 
with such changes in other regions. This is a surprising result, even though previous 
papers, like Boarnet (1998) for the Californian counties and Lopez-Bazo et al. (2007) for 
the Spanish provinces, also found a negative spillover effect of public infrastructure 
investment. Negative spillovers we suggest involve mainly private capital as a result of 
private investment decisions, rather than labour, and this migration of mobile factors will 
be induced by better stocks of infrastructure. The larger stock of private capital will 
enhance labour productivity and hence wages.  
 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 briefly sketches the theoretical 
model; section 3 is concerned with issues related with the data. Section 4 details the 
empirical model and its estimation, and finally section 5 gives some concluding remarks. 
 
2. THE THEORETICAL MODEL 
 
 
The New Economic Geography theory assumes imperfect competition, increasing 
returns and pecuniary externalities. The dynamics are path-dependent, determined by the 
initial conditions and by assumptions made about exogenous parameters resulting in 
multiple equilibria.  
 
The theory used here is set out by Fujita et al. (1999), which is the basic two-region 
two-sector core-periphery model. The economy is divided into two sectors, the 
competitive sector (C) and the monopolistically competitive sector (M), allowing 
transport costs for the M sector and assuming zero trade costs1 for the C sector.  
 
Preferences are Cobb-Douglas, so: 
 
θθ −= 1CMU        (1) 
 
in which θ  is the expenditure share in M goods and under the normalizations employed 
is also the equilibrium number of workers per firm and the equilibrium output per firm. 
 
Also we use a CES sub-utility function for varieties in M, so that the quantity of 
the composite good M is a function of the h=1…x varieties m(h), 
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Where x is the number of varieties, σ is the elasticity of substitution for M varieties and at 
equilibrium m(h) is a constant across all x varieties. 
 
The model reduces to five simultaneous non-linear equations. The first one, and 
the one we use in this paper, involves a simple relationship between the M sector nominal 
wage level ( ) and the market potential variable. In the short run the equilibrium wage 
in the monopolistically sector is occasioned by the fast entry and exit of firms driving 
profits to zero. 
M
iw
 
                                                 
1 This could occur if the C sector is concerned more with moving information than goods, or if the sector is 
characterised by lack of bulk products, so that transport is a negligible part of overall costs. 
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In equation (3) i denotes region, is area i total M wage bill,  is the M workforce, 
and the summation is over the set of regions including i. The transport cost is denoted 
by , is a price index in M,  is the income and σ is the elasticity of substitution for 
M varieties. 
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In this theory, goods in sector C are freely transported and produced under 
constant returns. Therefore C wages and price indexes are constant across regions, so the 
five simultaneous equations are reduced to three (equations 4, 5 and 6). Following Fujita 
et al (1999), the M price index is given by  
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in which the number of varieties produced in region r is captured by λ, which is equal to 
the share in region r of the total supply of M workers.  
 
Income is given by  
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rY  depends on the nominal M sector wage rate
M
rw , the C sector wage rate , the 
number of M varieties
C
rw
rλ and the equivalent number of C varieties rφ . It also depends on 
θ  which is the total number of M workers adding across all regions, although 0 < θ  < 1 
since it is measured on a scale such that the overall number of workers in the economy is 
equal to 1. Consequently the total number of C workers in the economy is 1 - θ . 
Taking logs to equation 3 the basic wage equation is  
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M
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Wage rates are also assumed to depend on factors other than market potential. We 
assume that an important factor is the level of efficiency of workers (Ai). We assume that 
technology is homogeneous across areas and the difference in the ability of workers to 
apply this technology is what makes production more efficient. Our initial assumption is 
that efficiency depends on the extent of upper level education and on the public capital 
stock endowment within each province. 
 
Introducing these additional variables means that we have a departure from the 
traditional reliance on purely pecuniary externalities. However in the real world a range 
of factors will play a part in determining observed wage rates, and not taking them into 
account will bias the econometric estimates that are obtained.  
 
The extended wage equation becomes: 
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Other researchers have also considered additional variables to extend the basic 
NEG equation, as for example Combes et al (2005). This equation, as shown by Head 
and Mayer (2006), can be obtained from micro assumptions, by introducing a labour 
quality adjusted production function for the firm.   
 
In addition, we also assume that the level of efficiency within a given province is related 
to the level in other provinces that are nearby, due to spillover effects across space. This 
means that the level of efficiency is dependent on covariates X and on ‘nearby’ efficiency 
levels denoted by the matrix product Wln(A). Written in general matrix notation, the 
vector for efficiency level is 
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In which X is an n by k matrix of exogenous variables (with columns equal to 1, and 
variables lnH and lnK), b is a k by 1 vector of coefficients, the matrix product Wln(A) is 
an n by 1 vector with scalar coefficient ρ, and vector ξ  represents excluded variables 
which behave as random shocks.  
 
Variable H is a measure of human capital, whereas K denotes productive public capital 
stock. Both are assumed to be the fundamental determinants of the level of labour 
efficiency within a province, alongside unmodeled factors represented byξ . A higher 
level of human capital (as reflected by educational attainment) will enhance the 
efficiency of labour, and likewise it is assumed that labour efficiency will be increased by 
superior public capital stock in the form of better transport infrastructure, and publicly 
provided services such as water, electricity  and health services. The endogenous variable 
Wln(A) represents the additional contribution to efficiency which is assumed to be due to 
‘nearby’ provinces. The hypothesis is that regions with high labour efficiency levels 
occurring in neighbouring regions will also incur higher labour efficiency than would 
otherwise be the case, and vice versa for regions with lower labour efficiency. A possible 
reason for this could be that labour is mobile and carries its efficiency level to other 
provinces mainly as a result of commuting. The implication of this is that labour 
efficiency in distant regions will have less impact, so that “who your neighbours are” is 
important. 
 
To conceptualise the spillover phenomenon, observe that it implies the spatial 
spillover of the exogenous variables, going to infinity, since for W with elements less 
than 1 and 1ρ < , under the Leontieff expansion model (8) is equal to   
 
1ln ( ) ( ) ( )(i iA I W Xb W Xb )ρ ξ ρ−= − + = +ξ∑                                   (9) 
in which the summation is from i = 0 to ∞, 0W I= , and in general is the matrix 
product of  and W . We re-express this as  
iW  
1iW −
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Suppose that instead of the endogenous spatial lag , we simply use the 
exogenous lags ( ) to capture the spillover across province boundaries of the 
effects of variables H and K. This simplifies our estimation routine, but at the expense of 
omitting the unmodelled effects
lnW A
,WH WK
ξ . Alternative assumptions such as this are considered in 
more detail below.  
 
We considered different alternatives when selecting the matrix W, but preferred to adopt 
a (standardised2) first order binary spatial contiguity matrix in which the elements are one 
when provinces share a common border, and zero otherwise3. Other definitions, based on 
the quantitative ‘distance’ between the different provinces, as well as the (economic) size 
of provinces were also tried, but these involved major assumptions also and resulted in 
less well-fitting models.  
On taking logs of equation (7), ignoring subscripts and writing 1
1a σ= , we obtain 
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in which  w represents measurement error. 
 
Then substituting for lnA gives 
 
1
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2 With rows summing to 1. 
3 The elements of the main diagonal are set to zero by convention. 
Multiplying through by ( )I Wρ−  gives  
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which when rearranged is equal to  
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Various reduced models can be derived from this specification. Consider first the 
assumption that the stock of productive public capital has no effect on labour efficiency, 
so that , hence  3 0a =
 
1 0 2(ln ln ) ln ( )ln lnM Mw W w a P W P a a H I Wρ ρ ξ= + − + + + + −        (14) 
 
Next, assume that there is no inter-Provincial spillover of efficiency levels (A). This 
means that ρ  is restricted to zero, and we can test this hypothesis by fitting the model 
 
1 0 2 3ln ln lnln Mw a P a a H a K
w
ψ
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= +                                (15) 
 
Also, assume that there is neither inter-Provincial efficiency level spillover nor a direct 
public capital effect, in which case the model becomes 
 
1 0 2ln lnln Mw a P a a H ξ ψ= + + + +                                      (16) 
 
Next, assume that there is spillover but this does not involve the totality of the causes of 
efficiency variation but simply involves the exogenous lags, so that there are no 
spillovers of unmodelled effects acting on A and embodied in theξ , hence 
 
1 0 2 3 4 5ln ln ln ln lnln Mw a P a a H a K a W H a W K ψ= + + + + + +              (17) 
 
This model can be reduced further, for example we can also test the hypothesis that the 
effect of public capital stock does not spill over but that human capital does by 
assuming , hence  5 0a =
 
1 0 2 3 4ln ln ln lnln Mw a P a a H a K a W H ψ= + + + + +                   (18) 
 
Although not pertaining to the main hypothesis of this paper, that there is a significant 
effect due to lnK, a further simplification is to assume that lnA is zero, so that neither 
public capital stock nor human capital has any effect of the level of wages, which depend 
only on the pecuniary externalities one associates with the basic NEG theory, so that  
 
1 0lnln Mw a P a w= + +                                                    (19) 
 
with the constant retained to allow for autonomous wage growth due to unexplained 
productivity increases that are constant across provinces.   
 
3. DATA 
 
In order to analyze the impact of public capital stock on productivity the empirical 
model was fitted to the period 1985-2001 for the Spanish provinces4 .  
 
For each year we represent Mrw by province r’s gross value added (GVA) in industry 
sectors (including building and energy activities) divided by r’s industrial employment.  
GVA is measured in thousands of constant (2000) euros, data which were provided by 
FBBVA (La Renta Nacional de España y su Distribución Provincial) until 1997, and 
thereafter by Fundación de las Cajas de Ahorro Confederadas (FUNCAS) 5  as 
documented in “Balance Económico Regional”. We attribute the difference between 
wages and GVA per worker to measurement error, which is represented by w in equation 
(11).  
  
Our human capital variable (H) is the proportion of people in each province with 
higher education, data published in “Human Capital in Spain and its distribution by 
provinces (1964-2004)” by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas (IVIE).  
 
Finally, the productive public capital stock ( ) was taken from the publication 
“Capital Stock in Spain and its distribution by territories (1964-2003)”
K
6 which detailed 
work done by FBBVA in collaboration with IVIE. This variable is essentially composed 
of two elements, namely the transportation infrastructure and the local public capital 
stock, since these two are assumed to be the productive part of overall public capital 
stock. Transportation includes airports, ports, road and railways infrastructures, and local 
public capital stock comprises local government infrastructures of various kinds, 
infrastructure relating to water supply and management, plus other residual investments. 
  
The Market Potential variable (P) is constructed using the kernel of equation (3), 
which we repeat here with the assumed trade cost function in place, hence   
 
                                                 
4 Spanish provinces correspond to level 3 of the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) of 
EUROSTAT, the Statistical Office of the European Union. The average surface of a representative 
province is 10,120 km2 (range 1,980 km2 to 21,766 km2). 
5 In order to make the Gross Value Added and employment series homogeneous we took the rates of 
growth of the variable in FUNCAS database and applied it to the variable produced by FBBVA. Previously 
we had to transform the valued added into constant euros of 2000 using the Implicit Index Prices facilitated 
by both organisations. 
6 New methodology. 
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This is a function of the M sector price index, which with the trade cost function  is  
1
1 1( ) ][ irDMMi r
r
w eG τ σ σλ − −= ∑ , so that for province i the price index depends on the  wage 
rate Mw multiplied by trade cost  and on the number of M varieties produced in area 
r denoted by 
irDeτ
rλ  , summing across all provinces.  
 
In order to calculate trade cost , we use straight line distances between Provincial 
capitals, denoted for origin i and destination r by , scaled by 
irDeτ
irD τ  which is equal to 
0.001.  
 
Distances within provinces are estimated using the convention that 
 
2
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i
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where is the number of square km in province i. This is 2/3rds of the radius R of a 
circle with area equals to that of province i, and is equal to the average distance from the 
centre of all points within a circle. The trade cost function produces non-negative scalars 
greater that 1, that are multiplied by the wage rates to allow for the additional cost of 
transport within and between provinces in calculating the price index.  
iarea
 
As shown by equation (5), income  depends on the nominal M sector wage raterY
M
rw , 
the C sector wage rate , the number of M varietiesCrw rλ and the equivalent number of C 
varieties rφ . It also depends on θ  which is the total number of M workers adding across 
all regions, although 0 < θ  < 1 since it is measured on a scale such that the overall 
number of workers in the economy is equal to 1. Consequently the total number of C 
workers in the economy is 1 - θ . 
 
 In order to calculate the income given by equation (5), we also need the wage , 
which represents the average wage in non-industrial C sectors. Since the C sector incurs 
no trade costs, this is constant across provinces in any one year. It is obtained as the sum 
of non-industrial GVA divided by sum of non-industrial employment, in both cases 
summing across provinces in any one year. Also the total number of M workers in the 
whole economy 
C
rw
θ  is taken as the overall share of total employment in each year that is 
engaged in M activities, which is equal to the total industry employment divided by total 
employment. The quantity rλ is equal to province r’s share of the total number of M 
(industry) workers in the economy. Likewise rφ  is equal to the proportion in province r 
of the total number of workers in non-industrial sectors in the economy. 
 
The final quantity needed to calculate is the elasticity of substitution of M sector 
varieties
iP
σ . Rather than estimate this value, it is assumed to equal 6.25, which is a central 
value among the range of estimates provided by the literature7, and equal to the mid-point 
of the range given by Head and Mayer (2003). Neither of the two main alternative 
approaches to obtaining the value of σ  is feasible in the current context. One is direct 
nonlinear estimation, as carried out for example by Mion (2004) and Brakman et al 
(2006), but this would be difficult to operationalise given the iterative estimation methods 
used here. The other alternative is the two-step linear estimation approach of Redding and 
Venables (2004), but this relies on bilateral trade flows which are unavailable for Spain’s 
provinces. Anderson and van Wincoop (2004) summarize various estimates, which are 
largely within the range 5 to 10.   
 
 
4. RESULTS 
The advantages of panel models are well known, most significantly they allow one to 
control for country-specific heterogeneity and the simplest way to do this is by 
introducing fixed effects (using either dummy variables or equivalently mean deviations, 
to allow for different intercepts). Given also that we have data for 20 years, it is also 
important to control for changes that has affected all provinces equally as the Spanish 
economy has adjusted through time, we therefore routinely include individual (province) 
and year fixed effects in all our specifications.  
 
Our most complex model is equation (13), which for year t is  
 
1 0 2 3ln ln (ln ln ) ln ln ( )
 
M M
t t t t t t tw W w a W P a a H a K I WP tρ ρ ξ= + − + + + + −+ ρ ω  
in which the log of M sector productivity is denoted by ln Mw , which is an n x 1 vector at 
time t, W is the n x n  standardised contiguity matrix, so that on multiplication the 
resulting n x 1 vector ln MtwW  is the spatial lag of n x 1 vector,  is market potential,  
and  is the spatial lag of market potential. Also the n x 1 vector l  is the log of 
our measure of human capital and equivalently l  denotes public capital stock. Finally 
the specification includes an n x 1 vector of errors 
tP
ln tW P n tH
n tK
tξ  plus the moving average error 
process given by ( )I Wρ tω
        
− . In practice, for simplicity, we drop the assumption of a 
moving average error process in favour of independent identically distributed errors, 
                                         
7 Head and Ries (2001) estimate values ranging from 7.9 to 11.4, the range is 5 to 10 in Harrigan (1993), 3 
to 8.4 in Feenstra (1994), and there are point estimates of 9.28 in Eaton and Kortum (2002) and 6.4 in Baier 
and Bergstrand (2001).    
assuming they are . All other models fitted are nested within this specification, 
as a result of setting parameter 
2(0, )N σ I
ρ  and the parameters to zero.  a
 
Model 1 in table 1 estimates our closest approximation to the equation (13) specification, 
but there are some differences between this ideal and the model estimated, due to 
practical problems and available software, although the estimates obtained remain 
informative. The estimates were obtained using the ML approach initially developed by 
Elhorst (2003) with the likelihood function accommodating the endogeneity of the spatial 
lag ln MtW w . For simplicity, table 1 omits the estimates of the time and individual fixed 
effects, focussing on the variables of substantive interest. Note also that we have allowed 
for the parameter restrictions involving ρ , using an iterative routine to ensure that the 
parameter equalities are satisfied. The iterations commence with [ 1ln lnt tP W Pρ− ] 
defined by assuming an initial value of ρ  denoted by 1ρ , which allows subsequently 
estimation as the coefficient on ln MtW w . In the next iteration this estimated 2ρ ρ=  gives 
an update of vector [ 2tP Wln ln tPρ− ], leading to another estimate 3ρ ρ= , and so on.  
The iterations terminate at iteration k where 1k k 0.00001ρ ρ −− < . 
 
Table 1: Estimates1 using ML and 2SLS 
REGRESSORS8 Parameter Estimates  
 Model 1* 
Iterative 
ML 
Model 2# 
2SLS 
Model 3# 
2SLS 
Model 4# 
2SLS 
Productivity Spatial Lag  
[WlnwM] 
-0.00198  9
(-0.04) 
-0.20910 8 0
(-0.66) 
0.0878546 
(0.76) 
-0.2981043 
(-1.32) 
Market Potential 
[lnP-ρWlnP] 
0.27836  7
(10.64) 
0.2656505 
(4.73) 
0.2364588 
(3.08) 
0.3099267 
(6.58) 
Public Capital 
[lnK] 
0.095090 
(3.66) 
0.0785483 
(2.04) 
0.1064016 
(3.51) 
0.0660099 
(1.95) 
Human Capital 
[lnH] 
0.039581 
(4.25) 
0.0409199 
(4.06) 
0.0353291 
(3.29) 
0.0465434 
(4.53) 
R squared 
Shwartz criterion (SC) 
Akaike criterion (AIC) 
0.9577 
49.6411 
15.4776 
0.8498 
 
0.8516 
 
0.8471 
Error variance 0.0018    
F test (46,870)Ф  200.70 203.02 197.41 
Squared Correlation2 0.957703    
Instruments  lnP_WlnP 
lnK 
lnH 
WlnK 
WlnH 
Temporal 
dummies 
WlnwM  
lnK 
lnH 
WlnK 
WlnH 
Temporal 
dummies 
lnK 
lnH 
Temporal 
dummies 
rank[lnP-ρWlnP] 
rank[lnP-ρWlnP] 
Notes: 
*t-ratios given in brackets beneath the estimates 
# z-ratios given in brackets beneath the estimates 
1 Spatial and time period fixed effects included in each model 
2 Between fitted and actual productivity  
                                                 
8 Time sub indexes have been omitted  from the table and from the comments to simplify  notation.  
  Model 2: 2SLS instrumenting endogenous spatial lag 
tial variable 
arket potential variable 
ne way in which we have deviated from the equation (13) template is by assuming that 
  Model 3: 2SLS instrumenting compound market poten
  Model 4: instrumenting both endogenous spatial lag and compound m
Ф F test of the null that all fixed effects are zero (value). 
 
O
t
inv
P  is exogenous, whereas in reality construction of P  introduces two-way causation 
olving 
t
Mw . In addition, P  may possess measureme t error for two reasons. One is 
the assump  that we have fined the M sector appropriately. The second reason is that 
we are assuming that the elasticity of substitution 
t
de
n
tion
σ  is equal to 6.25 .  
 
With these caveats in mind, the estimates suggest that there are highly significant and 
direct (within-province) effects due to market potential, public capital stock and human 
capital, but importantly the suggestion is that there are no inter-Provincial spillovers of 
worker efficiency levels (A) per se since ρ  is not significantly different from zero.  
 
An important initial finding for our purposes is the indication that the effect of public 
odel 2 in table 1 gives equivalent 2LSLS estimates, instrumenting for the endogenous 
investment on productivity is positive and highly significant. However, we remain  
cautious in our interpretation and look for supporting evidence via the use of different 
estimation techniques that do not have such strict distributional assumptions and which 
attempt to take care of any simultaneity or measurement error bias by the use of 
instrumental variables.   
 
M
ln MtW w . Again an iterative process ensures that parameter constraints hold. The 
estimates in model 2 indicate that resulting ρ  is not significantly different from zero. In 
this case the instruments are the ‘exogenous’ variables ln lnt tP W Pρ− , H and K, the 
spatial lags given by the matrix product of W and H and K H and WK, and 
the year dummies. Thus, while there appear to be significant direct effects due to human 
and public capital, evidently productivity is unaffected by efficiency level spillovers from 
contiguous provinces. As shown in table 1, comparing models 1 and 2, the coefficients 
signs, the coefficient estimates and their significance levels are all very similar, the main 
difference being that the market potential variable, which, although still very important, 
decreases in level of significance. 
 
, denoted by W
e obtain similar results when instrumenting the market potential variable. The model 3 W
estimates in table 1 are the outcome of instrumenting ln lnt tP W Pρ−  using the same 
instruments as for model 2 except that ln MtW w  repla n Pces ln ltP W tρ− . Note that 
instrumenting both ln lnP W Pt tρ−  and  ln Mtw  sim
ably be
W ultaneously using these instruments 
produces insignifica cause of the effects of collinearity on 
parameters and standard error estimates, so we do not report these results. However if we 
use the ranks of the variables ln lnt tP W P
nt estimates, presum
ρ−  and ln MtW w  as their instruments, then the 
model 4 estimates are obtained
 
.  
The estimates presented in table 1 represent spillover effects by the endogenous lag 
ln MtW w , in other words we base our models on  equation (13).  However none of our 
roduces a significant effect due to lnmodels p MtW w . We next turn to modelling 
spillovers by means of exogenous spatial lags, as exemplified by equation (17). This 
builds on the fact that most of the literature on the effects of public investment focuses on 
whether or not infrastructure has productive effects and pays relatively little attention to 
how productive public capital might shift economic activity from one place to another. 
There are reasons to believe that public investment in neighbouring provinces might have 
a positive impact on productivity within a given province, given connections such as 
roads, railways or airports. On the other hand, negative spillovers might exist perhaps due 
to the migration of factors to locations with superior infrastructure stocks. Public 
investment in one region could have a negative effect on other regions that are its closest 
competitors for labour and mobile capital. It is argued that spillovers might be one of the 
causes behind the different effects of public investment on productivity. Many 
researchers argue that positive spillovers could explain why studies of national time-
series data typically find larger output elasticities for public capital than elasticities 
estimated by papers that analyse regional data. The existence of positive spillovers could 
be responsible for the apparently low impact of public investment on regional 
productivity. As equation (17) shows, our analysis of spillovers explicitly involves 
human and public capital variables, namely the exogenous lags WH and WK.  The 
estimates are given in table 2. 
 
Table 2: Models with exogenous lags 
REGRESSORS mates Parameter Esti
 Model 5# Model 7# Model 6# 
Market Potential 
0     0.  
 Lag Public Capital -0  -0 -0
0.  0. 0.
an Capital -0
d  0  0.  
0)Ф 
Instruments  
Temporal dummies Temporal dummies 
 
[lnP] 
 Capital 
0.2080611  
   (11.89)
0.2108861 
  (3.05)
0.2838018    
     (11.60)   
Public
[lnK] 
.1852316 
(6.36)    
1849532
 (6.31)    
 0.1792644  
 (6.24)    
Spatial
[WlnK] 
apital 
.3572691  
   (-6.87)   
.3575304 
 (-7.01)   
..362532   
  (-7.17)   
Human C
[lnH] 
 Lag Hum
0357592    
(3.77)    
0358972 
 (3.30)    
0419196  
 (4.45)    
Spatial
[WlnH] 
.0006924 
(-0.04) ... ... 
R square 0.8587 .8588 8603
F test (46,87 227.99 228.89 231.47 
lnK 
 lnH 
WlnK 
 WlnH 
sqkm 
lnK 
 lnH  
WlnK 
WlnH 
Notes: 
s given in brackets beneath the estimates 
 in each model 
he estimates for model 5 show that the variable market potential (P) has a significant 
effect on (our proxy for) productivity, indicating that high levels of market potential 
 # z-ratio
Spatial and time period fixed effects also included
Ф F test of the null that all fixed effects are zero. 
 
T
correspond to higher wage rates. Since market potential is endogenous, it is instrumented 
by  H, K, WH, WK and by the time dummies, plus an additional instrument sqkm equal to 
the surface area of each province in square km (to allow identification). Both 
determinants of labour efficiency within each province (H, K) are statistically significant, 
but while the exogenous lag WH is insignificant, there is a highly significant WK effect, 
which also happens to be negative. 
 
Given the insignificance of human capital spillovers WH, we next estimate model 6 
aving eliminated WH, and it is apparent that the results are effectively the same, as h
shown in table 2. Model 6 is our preferred specification, with insignificant lag WH and 
additional instrument sqkm omitted. Note that we do not reject the null that the 
coefficient on ln P  is not significantly different from 1σ − , where 6.25σ =  is the  value 
assumed in the construction of ln P . This provides empirical support for our a priori 
assumption reg ng the value of ardi σ . The test statistic equals 0.54 w s a p-value of 
0.46 in the appropriate null distribution, which is the 21
hich ha
χ  distribution. The magnitude of 
the elasticity of public infrastructu  for the Spanish regions is 0.18, within the range of 
variation of the elasticities obtained in other papers. In Mas et al. (1994, 1996), the 
elasticity associated with productive public infrastructures is 0.23 and 0.08, respectively. 
Goerlich and Mas (2001) reported an elasticity of 0.02 and Boscá et al. (2006) obtained 
an output elasticity of 0.026 for public infrastructures (0.035 in the long run). We can be 
quite confident in interpreting the results obtained, as the coefficients sign and 
significance do not change when the spillover of human capital is not considered in the 
estimation. 
 
The sign
re
 on spatial infrastructure spillovers is also inconclusive in the literature. 
oltz-Eakin and Schwartz (1995), for the US, provide no evidence of spatial 
infr
determinants of labour efficiency within each province (H, 
) are statistically significant, and while the exogenous lag WH is insignificant, there is a 
H
astructure spillovers. In contrast, Pereira and Roca-Sagalés (2003), Cohen and 
Morrison (2004) and Bronzini et al. (2008) find significant positive spatial spillovers for 
Spain, the US and Italy, respectively. Most interestingly, Boarnet (1998), using data for 
California’s counties, found that the output of counties is negatively affected by 
neighbouring counties’ infrastructure. Sloboda and Yao (2008) for the US, Delgado and 
Alvarez (2007) for the Spanish economy, and Pereira and Andraz (2006) for Portuguese 
regions, argue that public capital provided in a particular region raises the comparative 
advantage of that region compared with others, and could therefore attract production 
factors from other locations where output or productivity might consequently decrease. 
The development of new network infrastructure may alter the location decisions of firms, 
increasing investments and outputs in some provinces while causing disinvestments and 
possible job losses for others. 
 
In our study we find that both 
K
highly significant spatial lag for WK, which is negative. This finding is surprising 
because, as mentioned earlier, most of the previous literature suggests a positive or non-
significant effect on public investment spillovers, but not a negative one. However there 
is now growing evidence of negative effects, first by Boarnet (1998) with reference to 
California counties and later by Kelejian and Robinson (1997) and Chandra and 
Thompson (2000). Likewise Lopez-Bazo et al. (2007) arrived at the same conclusion 
using a different theoretical approach for the Spanish provinces. The explanation has to 
do with the fact that when the public sector decides to invest in one province, it attracts 
capital and possibly labour from nearby regions causing a negative spillover effect. The 
argument given by Lopez-Bazo et al. (2007) is that there appears to be negative spillover 
effects across regions in transport capital investment that actually counteract their 
positive effects inside each region (typically one would expect good road and rail 
connections in neighbouring provinces to be beneficial). They suggest that the magnitude 
of negative spillovers exceeds that of positive ones across a relatively short distance, so 
that would be internalised within a larger area.  
 
Another interesting outcome derived from our model is the absence of spillover effects in 
e human capital variable. This result suggests that labour is not commuting in large 
inally, model 7 gives the corresponding OLS estimates, in which the larger coefficient 
n is significantly different from
th
volumes between provinces. It is probably explained by the fact that, as labour is 
typically concentrated in the capital of the province, and capitals tend to be fairly 
centrally located within their respective provinces, on the whole distances between 
capitals are too great and transport costs to high to allow mass commuting. On the other 
hand, were we to estimate the model using municipalities, we are more likely to 
encounter positive spillovers in human capital because of the lower costs of commuting. 
 
 
F
 ln P   1σ −o , with test statistic equal to 25.61, which has a 
p-value which is exceedingly  small in  21χ . This adds further support to our preference 
for the model 6 parameter estimates obtained by treating ln P  as endogenous. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
een public infrastructure and productivity has been analysed using a 
odel based on New Economic Geography theory, with a version of the so-called wage 
ided us with a satisfactory theory on which to base our 
alysis of the impact of public capital, which we show to be an important variable, with 
 
The relationship betw
m
equation estimated using a spatial panel, with fixed time and province effects, to control 
for spatial public investment spillovers between contiguous Spanish provinces. The 
substantive conclusion we come to as a result of this analysis is that there is evidence in 
support of the wage equation involving market potential, human capital and public 
capital, with significant positive effects on the wage level, which we adopt as our proxy 
for the level of productivity. 
  
The wage equation has prov
an
1% increase inducing nearly 0.18% increase in productivity. This result is effectively 
unchanged under different model specifications, pointing to the robustness of our 
estimates. In contrast the elasticity associated with human capital is much smaller, 
although it is still statistically significant. These conclusions are made in the context of 
fixed year and province effects in our model, so that we are controlling for unmodeled 
heterogeneity in the effects we report. The productivity impact attributable to public 
capital is particularly important at a time when falling demand is leading many private-
sector employers to shed labour and reduce their level of production. Public investments, 
which create jobs directly can generate demand and help to break a downward economic 
trend, are seen not to be wasteful, for they raise productivity also.  
 
Additionally, an interesting outcome of our analysis is that there is a significant spillover 
ffect involving public capital in ‘nearby’ provinces, which turns out to be negative in e
sign. What we find is that if the weighted average of the level of public capital in 
surrounding provinces is high, then a province’s wage level is reduced. We can interpret 
this as an effect of competition from neighbours. Public capital provided in one place is 
thought to enhances the comparative advantage of that place relative to others not 
receiving the capital investment. As argued by Boarnet (1998), negative output spillovers 
can result when mobile factors of production migrate to competing locations with the best 
infrastructure stocks. The negative spillovers of public investment might explain the 
results obtained in some previous papers which found a non-significant effect of public 
investment on a national level.  
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